1.

On trade protection Archibald Hurd: The Merchant Navy volume I (London: John Murray, 1921) pp.216-223 and pp.239-252. On defensive armament experiments ibid. pp.120-121

2.

Martin Gilbert: Winston S. Churchill volume III 1914-1916 Companion (London: William Heinemann, 1972) pp.116-117 - Letter from W.S. Churchill to Sir Edward Grey and Walter Runicman

3.

Hurd: Merchant Navy pp.228-239

4.

On defensive arming in the Mediterranean see The National Archives: Public Records Office MT23 (a number of files for 1915)

5.

On detailed aspects of the war in the Med see Paul G. Halpern: The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914-1918 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987) chapters 4 to 8

6.

On the economic aspects see Gerd Herdach: The First World War 1914-1918 (London: Penguin Books, 1977) p.45 - citing J.A. Salter: Allied Shipping Control: An Experiment in International Administration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921) p.361

7.

Willem Hackmann: Seek & Strike (London: HMSO, 1984) p.15

8.

In spite of this there were limited plans for offensive mining: intriguingly there were to be mined ambushes. See TNA: PRO ADM 137/843 - Secret Packet E. Also note, the original reason for the mining ops off West Hinder to the Belgian Coast as of 1^st October 1914 was a cover for the ‘Churchill’ landings. See TNA: PRO ADM 137/843 - hand written order to CCML

9.

Paul G. Halpern: A Naval History of World War I (London: UCL, 1994) p.296

10.

Ibid. p.300

11.

Hackmann: Seek & Strike pp.4-10

12.

Ibid. p.17 and p.24

13.

Ibid. pp.47-55

14.

John Terraine: Business in Great Waters (London: Leo Cooper, 1989) p.27

15.

Ibid. pp.30-31

16.

David Lloyd-George: War Memoirs volume I (London: Odhams Press, undated) pp.641-642

17.

Arthur J. Marder: From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow volume V (Oxford: OUP, 1970) pp.313-315

18.

Halpern: Naval History chapters 11-13

19.

One example TNA: PRO ADM 137/3 - Confidential report of "Convoy of Canadian Expeditionary Force, October 1914" No.5 by Rear Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss

20.

From a number of papers including TNA: PRO ADM 137/1027 - Confidential "Letter of Proceedings" from Vice Admiral Sturdee No. 42/17 7-20 December 1914. Also see ships’ logs TNA: PRO ADM 53/69709, BT 165/1293, BT 165/1266, BT 165/1173, BT 165/1138, BT 165/1279, BT 165/1182, BT 165/1272, BT 156/1186, BT 165/1117 and diary of C.A. Bourne PO(RNR) Imperial War Museum: 85/25/1

21.

Halpern: Naval History p.351

22.

General points Halpern: Naval History pp.353-356. On aircraft see Terraine: Business pp.36-38 and p.90

23.

Technical aspects Terraine: Business pp.29-30. On hunting groups Halpern: Naval History pp.342-343 and pp.366-368. Details of mine ‘barrier’ operations are widespread.

24.

Terraine: Business p.28 

25.

 Ibid. pp.27-28

26.

 Arthur J. Marder: From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow volume IV (Oxford: OUP, 1969) pp.87-88

27.

 Terraine: Business pp.125-126

28.

 Halpern: Naval History p.416

29.

Terraine: Business p.79

30.

Marder: Dreadnought volume IV pp.176-177 and p.215. Also, Hardach: First World War pp.44.47

31.

Halpern: Naval History p.398

32.

Marder: Dreadnought volume IV pp.175-181

33.

Ibid. volume IV chapter VIII; and volume V chapter I

34.

Hardach: First World War pp.48-52 and pp.123-131

35.

Marder: Dreadnought volume IV pp.65-66

36.

Panikos Panayi (editor): Racial Violence in Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Leicester: LUP, revised 1996) pp.92-111

37.

Marder: Dreadnought volume IV p.192

38.

The general suspicions of the RN towards all others of the sea were widespread. Foreigners were suspect by pure virtue of not being British and consequently, often information relevant to their safety was deliberately withheld from them. One example (although in this case the Foreign Office compounded the problem) TNA: PRO FO 371/2171.

Regarding the British merchant service tow examples follow, one from the beginning of the war and one at the end. The hostile attitude of Captain Hubert Stansbury RN (Retired), DNTO Southampton, towards merchant seamen on transport service is clearly shown in dozens of files of the Admiralty Transport Department - TNA: PRO MT23. Incidentally, complaints appear in some of this correspondence by merchant officers to their union claiming incompetence by RN transport officers. Secondly, after all the shared experience, in the court of enquiry following the very last incident of merchant loss of the war, naval officers did not believe merchant officers that their ships (including SURADA) had been torpedoed: rather than having strayed into the minefiedl - TNA: PRO ADM 137/3582 and ADM 137/3590. The relevant volume of Der Krieg zur See clearly states that UC74 used torpedoes and that all the merchantmen concerned were well within the swept-channel.

Abuse of the fishing industry was rife during the early stages of the war: the RN maintaining that enemy mines were being laid by fishing-craft, when in reality they were not suitable for the task and RN patrolling was not up to the job. Proof of these attitudes can be found in a great many places. Subsequently, in areas where it was possible the older men and their vessels, subject to them not being requisitioned, attempted to fish. All seaworthy trawlers, drifters and their able-bodied crews basically found themselves in the RNR(T).

Regarding the reserves both RNR and RNVR, again there is evidence, although one has to dig deeper to find documentary proof. One example though is in the attitude of Lt-Cdr. O.M. Stokes RN towards a Cdr. (RNR) onboard OCEANIC. See Len Barnett: An Embarassing Loss - H.M. Armed Cruiser Oceanic 8^th September 1914 (London: Len Barnett, 2004)

39.

This is the figure most often quoted, which equates closely to the number on the memorial at Tower Hill, London - those with no known grave. However, the total loss must have been considerably higher, since I have also come across cases of men buried ashore, who were victims of sinkings. There were also others, such as one chief engineer, whose health was utterly destroyed in multiple sinkings and that died ashore in Newport News, in the USA. Apart from ships’ official logs and newspaper reports, it is very difficult to find details of the wounded, the number that must have been considerable.